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We present here a complement to Judge WayneGorman’s article on the law of sniffer-dog searchesin Canada found on page 52. Similar to Judge
Gorman’s article, we examine U.S. Supreme Court cases about
the use of police dogs in searches. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue of dog
sniffs in U.S. v. Place1 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection from unreasonable government searches and seizures
and requirements for obtaining a search warrant.2 We start
with a brief historical3 reminder of Fourth Amendment case
law to provide context for current sniffer-dog questions. Next,
we provide an overview of U.S. Supreme Court cases that have
addressed what role sniffer dogs should have in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 
A BRIEF FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment was born out of the American Rev-
olution with historians pointing to the colonists’ protests
against English writs of assistance as the spark that fired the
revolution.4 The writs of assistance allowed no specific suspi-
cion or pointed location for a search. Rather, the British offi-
cials could search businesses and homes with very little delay.5
Desiring not to return to life like they experienced under
British rule, the framers of the Bill of Rights included the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. For more than a century, no caselaw directly
focused on the Fourth Amendment.6 Near the turn of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States7
excluded evidence obtained by law enforcement who did not
have a warrant but still went into a home and seized papers
that implicated the defendant in a federal crime. In a unani-
mous decision, the Court developed what is known as the
Exclusionary Rule and excluded the evidence because the
papers were illegally obtained. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States8 the Exclusionary Rule was extended to evidence
that was obtained because of illegally acquired information.9
The primary goal of the Exclusionary Rule is to disincentivize
government officials from ignoring the law to search and seize
evidence that they could not lawfully obtain. In other words,
the rule is meant to “prevent, not to repair.”10
How are law enforcement agents to behave so they do not
have their evidence excluded? For almost 200 years, defining
a search or seizure rested on the common understanding of
physical intrusions.11 But, in 1967, the Court rejected the
physical trespass requirement detailed in earlier cases and
instead focused on a new understanding of Fourth Amend-
ment rights in Katz v. United States.12 Justice Harlan’s widely
relied upon concurring opinion outlined a two-prong test for
determining when the Fourth Amendment protections are trig-
gered. In the first prong, the question is whether the individ-
ual claiming an expectation of privacy had an actual, subjec-
tive expectation that the searched area or item was private. In
the second prong, the question is whether that subjective
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as rea-
sonable. The Supreme Court has applied the Katz logic in a
variety of places finding that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches involving the police digging through garbage
at the curb,13 wired police informants,14 bank-maintained
account records,15 a pen register on a telephone that records
the phone numbers called,16 or the area beyond the curtilage of
a home.17
In addition to the reasonableness clause, the Fourth
Amendment also includes the Warrant Clause. The plain lan-
guage of the Warrant Clause provides that a search should not
occur without a warrant. Nonetheless, the Court in United
States v. Rabinowitz18 held that warrants are unnecessary if a
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search is reasonable and conducted during a lawful arrest.
Importantly, the Court in Rabinowitz said there was no “fixed
formula”19 for determining reasonableness and defaulting to
always requiring a warrant is not appropriate. Instead, the
Court held that reasonableness would be determined in light of
the case facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the Court later
found that a search incident to an arrest is reasonable within
the “grabbable area.”20 More importantly, Terry v. Ohio21 held
that a police officer could stop and frisk a suspect looking for
weapons when the officer had a “reasonable suspicion” that
the person is engaged in criminal activity. The police do not
need a warrant and they do not need to have probable cause to
arrest the suspect, but their intrusions on individuals should
still be limited. 
When police engage in technology-aided investigations it
provides the Court with new case facts and circumstances to
consider. For example, in 2001, the Court in Kyllo v. United
States22 held that obtaining illegal drug-growing data from
thermal imaging was a Fourth Amendment search and the offi-
cers should have had a search warrant. The Court in Kyllo
seemed concerned with the efficiency of data collection from
the thermal imaging device and the fact that such a device
would not be commonly available to those not in law enforce-
ment. In a similar vein, law enforcement sniffer dogs are a spe-
cial type of searching technology. A frequently used means of
obtaining probable cause to search is a “sniff” for the presence
of illegal items such as explosives, cadavers, and drugs.23 In
these instances, the trained dog’s “alert” to the presence of
drugs frequently becomes the “probable cause” that serves as
the justification to conduct a warrantless search lawfully.24 In
fact, this practice is so widespread and common in American
policing that officers have been known to refer to dog-sniff
tests as “walking probable cause” or “probable cause on a
leash.”25 The following sections will detail the U.S. Supreme
Court caselaw in chronological order that has addressed such
sniffer dogs. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SNIFFER DOGS
U.S. V. PLACE26
Dog Sniff of Luggage Is Not a “Search”
When preparing to board his plane in Miami for New York
City, Raymond Place’s behavior attracted the attention of law
enforcement agents. Because he was preparing to board his
flight, the Miami agents alerted drug enforcement agents in
New York where Place was detained upon arrival. After Place
did not consent to a search of his luggage, the agents told him
they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to obtain
a search warrant. The officers then took the luggage to a differ-
ent New York airport where they subjected the luggage to a sniff
test by a trained narcotics detection
dog. The dog positively alerted to
the presence of narcotics in one of
the bags. Approximately 90 minutes
had elapsed from taking the bags
from Place to the dog at the other
airport. Because it was late on a
Friday afternoon, the officers kept
the luggage and secured a search
warrant on Monday morning at
which point they found cocaine in one of the bags. Place argued
that the warrantless seizure of his bag was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. At issue was whether based on reasonable
suspicion law enforcement could temporarily detain Place’s lug-
gage and subject it to a trained narcotics detection dog. 
The Supreme Court held that the officers’ lengthy seizure
and detention of the luggage exceeded the permissible bounds
set forth in Terry27 In dicta, the Court noted that the dog’s sniff
did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court stated that there must always be a bal-
ance between “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests.”28 Despite the substantial
government interest in detecting narcotics, the Court held that
the police violated Place’s Fourth Amendment rights when
they seized his luggage for 90 minutes and because of such a
lengthy seizure, the evidence obtained from the subsequent
search was inadmissible. Although arguably not a question
before them,29 the Court noted that the dog sniff was not a
search. They described the dog sniff of that luggage as unique
given that the dog was only trained to detect narcotics and was
able to sniff the bag while it was closed and all its contents
could remain private. The Court heralded the dog-sniff proce-
dure as limited in both manner and the information obtained
and not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND30
Dog Sniff Is Less Intrusive Than a Search
Almost two decades after Place, the Supreme Court again
had a case before them that involved narcotic-sniffing canines
when a city’s roadblock checkpoints were in question. The city
of Indianapolis was operating vehicle checkpoints to find ille-
gal drugs in passing cars. Cars were stopped without any rea-
sonable suspicion or probable cause, but simply because they
were at the checkpoint. Once a car was stopped, one officer
would walk a narcotics-sniffing dog around the car to deter-
mine if the dog would alert to the scent of drugs. Two stopped
motorists brought a lawsuit on behalf of the class of stopped
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were violated. Although the
Supreme Court noted that similar
checkpoints are permissible when
they are set up to increase highway
safety (e.g., verifying drivers’
licenses, drunk driving tests) or
are related to specific border secu-
rity issues, the Supreme Court
held in Edmond that checkpoints
to simply detect general illegal
activity are not. However, the Court again endorsed the dicta
in Place that a canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment
search saying, “Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automo-
bile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to
disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics. Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that
simply walks around a car is much less intrusive than a typical
search.”31 However, the question remained: “What privacy
interests are implicated by a drug-sniffing dog?” 
ILLINOIS V. CABALLES32
Random Dog Sniffing OK for Traffic Stop Citation
Roy Caballes was speeding down an Illinois interstate when
a state trooper pulled him over. A second trooper who was part
of the Police Drug Interdiction Team overheard the stop infor-
mation on the police dispatch and immediately proceeded to
the stop location with his narcotics-sniffing dog. While the
first trooper was in his squad car to finish issuing a warning
ticket for Caballes, the second trooper walked the dog around
the exterior of Caballes’ car. The dog alerted to the trunk of the
car, which led to a search of the trunk where the officers found
marijuana that led to a narcotics conviction for Caballes. 
Caballes argued the drug evidence should be excluded
because even though the whole incident only took 10 minutes,
the officers did not have specific and articulable facts related to
drugs that would have justified a drug-sniffing dog. Relying on
the uniqueness of dog sniffs as detailed by Place, the Supreme
Court held that the dog sniff in this instance did not violate
Caballes’ Fourth Amendment rights. They noted that using a
well-trained narcotics-detection dog does not infringe upon
legitimate privacy rights because the Court did not believe the
dog sniff changed the lawful character of a traffic stop. 
Both Justices Souter and Ginsberg wrote separate dissenting
opinions. Justice Souter’s dissent rested on the idea that
because research had demonstrated that even well-trained nar-
cotics-sniffing dogs have between a 12.5% to 60% false positive
rate, they are clearly not infallible. If the dogs are not infallible,
then Justice Souter reasoned, the sniff cannot be used without
probable cause since the officers did not have reasonable sus-
picion to conduct the additional search in the first place. Jus-
tice Ginsberg’s dissent focused on the need for reasonable sus-
picion to conduct this secondary search. She was less con-
cerned with the length of the search rather the lack of reason-
able suspicion before bringing in the drug-sniffing dog. 
FLORIDA V. HARRIS33
A Certified Dog Is Reliable Enough
Florida police officer William Wheetley was on a routine
patrol with his narcotics-sniffing dog, Aldo, when he pulled
over Clayton Harris for an expired license plate. Harris
appeared nervous to Officer Wheetley and had an open beer
can inside his truck. Officer Wheetley asked if he could search
Harris’s truck, but Harris refused. At this point, Officer Wheet-
ley brought Aldo out of the patrol car and walked him around
Harris’s truck. Aldo alerted to Harris’s driver’s-side door
handle. Using the alert as probable case, Officer Wheetley
searched Harris’s truck, and although he did not find any nar-
cotics (i.e., drugs that Aldo was trained to detect), he did find
a variety of items that were indicative of manufacturing
methamphetamine (i.e., meth). Officer Wheetley arrested him
and Harris confessed to making and using meth. Out on bail
from this first offense, Harris was again pulled over by the
same Officer Wheetley and Aldo—this time for a broken brake
light. Aldo again alerted to the same door handle, but this time
Officer Wheetley did not find anything during his search of
Harris’s truck. 
The Supreme Court in reviewing the Harris case examined
the question of what factors should be considered in deter-
mining a narcotics-sniffing dog’s reliability. The Court noted
that the reliability of the dog can be demonstrated by factors
such as the training and certification the dog has received
while minimizing the importance of field performance in reli-
ability analysis. Justice Kagan delivering the unanimous deci-
sion stated that “evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in
a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certi-
fied a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence
offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.
The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if
the dog has recently and successfully completed a training pro-
gram that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.”34 The
Court did note that even if a dog was generally reliable, there
could be surrounding circumstances that could undermine
probable cause from a particular alert. Some examples the
Court provided were the officer cuing the dog (consciously or
unconsciously) or if the dog was working in unfamiliar condi-
tions. The Court reasoned that none of those exceptions
applied for Aldo and there was no reason to believe that Aldo
was not reliable. As the court stated, Aldo’s “sniff is up to
snuff.”35
FLORIDA V. JARDINES36
The Court Shortens the Leash at Homes
The Supreme Court heard Florida v. Jardines with the Harris
case on October 31, 2012. The decisions for both cases came
down about five weeks apart in February and March of 2013.
Where Harris is about a dog sniffing a vehicle, Jardines is about
a dog sniffing the porch of a home. Based on a tip that mari-
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juana was being grown in the home of Joelis Jardines, two
detectives and a trained narcotic-sniffing dog approached Jar-
dines’s home. The dog alerted at the base of the front door,
which prompted the detective to obtain a search warrant. The
ensuing search of Jardines’s home revealed marijuana plants.
At issue for the Supreme Court was whether the dog sniffing
the front porch was a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Although the previous outlined cases seem to suggest that the
Supreme Court is giving a long leash to narcotic-sniffing dogs,
the Court in Jardines shortens the leash. That line is the private
home. In their holding that the dog sniff on Jardine’s front
porch was an unlawful warrantless search, the majority rely on
the fact that the officers were within the curtilage of the home
and the property rights inherent in one’s home. Justice Kagan
in her concurring opinion went a step further and analogized
the police dog to high-powered binoculars being used to look
inside a home through its windows. She concluded such would
not only be a trespass on a person’s property, but also an inva-
sion of person’s privacy. With this, Justice Kagan reinforced the
idea that trained sniffer dogs are powerful instruments not
available for general public use.37
RODRIGUEZ V. U.S.38
Dogs Can’t Sniff on Routine Traffic Safety Stops
Switching back to dogs sniffing cars, Justice Ginsburg deliv-
ered the majority opinion for Rodriguez. A Nebraska police
officer, Morgan Struble, pulled Dennys Rodriguez over after
witnessing Rodriguez swerve onto the shoulder of the high-
way. Struble is a K-9 officer and had his narcotics-sniffing dog
with him in his car. Rodriguez explained that he swerved to
miss a pothole. After issuing a formal warning to Rodriguez,
Officer Struble then asked if he could walk his dog around the
vehicle. Rodriguez refused consent, so Officer Struble
instructed Rodriguez to get out of his vehicle while they waited
for a second officer. After the second officer arrived, Officer
Struble took the dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle twice with the
dog alerting halfway through the second trip. Approximately
eight minutes had passed since the issuing of the warning and
the dog alerting. The majority focused on the fact that the
extension of the traffic stop for the dog sniff occurred after the
conclusion of the traffic stop, or in other words after the warn-
ing was issued, rather than the length of the extension. In
relaying the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the
police are not permitted to extend the duration of a traffic stop
without reasonable suspicion, even if it is only a minimum
amount of time. The use of a drug-sniffing dog, the Court rea-
soned, is for detecting criminal activity and is not part of a rou-
tine traffic stop meant to ensure vehicle safety on the roads. 
SUBSEQUENT LOWER-COURT DECISIONS
In the years since Jardines and Rodriguez, lower courts have
been confronted with a crop of
new issues in analyzing sniffer-
dog searches. The Minnesota
Supreme Court recently deter-
mined that, unlike a sniff of a
home’s front porch in Jardines,
use of a drug-sniffing dog in a
hallway immediately adjacent to
an apartment was not an uncon-
stitutional search.39 The Minnesota Supreme Court distin-
guished the apartment complex from the situation in Jardines,
clarifying that, “The area immediately adjacent to [the defen-
dant’s] apartment door is not analogous to the front porch in
Jardines because it is located in an internal, common hallway
that other tenants and the police jointly use and access.”40
The Colorado Supreme Court also departed from U.S.
Supreme Court reasoning when evaluating a drug-sniffing dog
search of a vehicle in People v. McKnight.41 Previous drug-sniff-
ing-dog-search opinions had relied on the reasoning in Place
that the use of a drug-sniffing dog does not implicate a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because these dogs only sniff
out illegal activity, but Colorado legalized marijuana under
their state constitution in January 2014. The Colorado
Supreme Court had previously held a positive alert of a drug-
sniffing dog could be used to support a finding of probable
cause to search a vehicle.42 But, according to the Colorado
Supreme Court most recently, because individuals can lawfully
possess marijuana in the state of Colorado, drug-sniffing dogs
are similar technology to the use of a thermal-imaging device
the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed in Kyllo.43 The Colorado
Supreme Court went on to hold that, because a sniff from a dog
trained to detect marijuana can reveal lawful activity, that sniff
is a search under the state constitution and must be justified by
probable cause.44
Sniffer dogs can detect contraband other than drugs, and an
appellate court in Massachusetts was confronted with one such
type of search in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Devoe.45 In
that case, police officers were investigating a report of a female
suspect with a firearm at a local park. The officers responded
with their sniffer dog who had been trained to detect firearms.
The dog positively alerted to the presence of a firearm in a bag
and the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm for not having a permit. The defendant argued the dog
sniff of her bag was unconstitutional. Similar to the Colorado
Supreme Court’s reasoning in McKnight, the Massachusetts
appellate court distinguished the firearm sniff because such a
sniff reveals potentially noncriminal activity (e.g., carrying a
concealed weapon with a valid permit). But the appellate court
did not reach the question of whether the sniff was an unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment and instead
deemed the search unconstitutional on other grounds.
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RESEARCH CONTINUES
Although the Court has held that dog sniffs are not searches
requiring probable cause, empirical research on the issue has
found that participants rated the intrusiveness of a dog sniff
similarly to a frisk, which the Court has held to be a search.46
Additionally, Chicago Tribune reporters Dan Hinkel and Joe
Mahr found that law enforcement dogs across a three-year
period were less than 50% accurate in accurately detecting
drugs or drug paraphernalia.47 The accuracy of the dog sniff
seems to impact how invasive their sniff is perceived. In two
separate studies, Professor Jane Bambauer told law students or
lay people the accuracy of the dog was either 100%, 99%, or
90%.48 The participants’ perception of the dog’s invasiveness
increased as the accuracy decreased. In other words, the less
accurate the dog was, the more invasive the sniff was perceived
to be. Professor Bambauer also found that participants were
more likely to think a dog sniff was a search when the sniff
target was a house compared to a car.49
Despite these findings, empirical questions remain about
public perceptions of police dogs and their sniffs. For example,
based on the Supreme Court attention to the issue, we have
examined a variety of locations beyond the simple car versus
home comparison. Our research indicates that more privacy is
expected for a home than for other types of living situations,
such as an apartment or hotel room, and that, contrary to Bam-
bauer’s findings and court assumptions, people might expect
an equivalent, high amount of privacy in their cars and their
homes.50 Similar to Bambauer, we found that a dog’s accuracy
can affect perceptions of the dog’s reliability.51 We also investi-
gated how quality of training and certification can impact per-
ceptions of the dog’s reliability (two of the issues raised in
Harris). We found that reliability perceptions were not influ-
enced by the quality of ongoing training the dog receives,
despite the fact that training was emphasized by the Court and
that higher-quality, continued training might actually improve
a dog’s reliability. However, current certification did increase
perceptions of the dog’s reliability. 
Additionally, we investigated the issues raised in Rodriguez
by varying whether a traffic stop was extended to conduct a
dog sniff or question the driver about drugs, whether the
extension to the traffic stop occurred before or after the ticket
was issued, and the length of time the traffic stop was extended
(2, 7, or 17 minutes). Consistent with the Court’s reasoning
that a dog sniff exceeds the ordinary type of investigation nec-
essary for a traffic stop, participants perceived dog sniffs as
more invasive than asking drug-related questions. Also consis-
tent with the Court’s reasoning that the timing of the extended
investigation relative to issuing a ticket is the most important
factor, participants perceived the extension of the stop as more
problematic when it was conducted after the ticket was issued
as opposed to before. Contrary to the Court’s argument that the
length of the extension of the stop is not important, partici-
pants thought that the stop was more problematic when the
delay was long (17 minutes) or moderate (7 minutes) rather
than minimal (2 minutes).
CONCLUSION
Generally, law-enforcement-trained-dog sniffs are not
searches requiring probable cause to conduct, unless con-
ducted within the curtilage of a home or someplace where the
dog and its handler are not entitled to be. As such, the police
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are usually not required to obtain a warrant or establish prob-
able cause before the dog sniff. But as the legal landscape
evolves, and new technology and privacy implications arise,
courts will continue to face novel fact patterns regarding dog
sniffs. Courts will have to address the issue of at what point a
sniffer dog crosses the line to an invasive technology similar to
the device used in Kyllo. The training and reliability of the
dogs, the ability to detect potentially lawful items, and the pri-
vacy of the area sniffed, are all concerns courts must consider
when evaluating these searches. 
Eve M. Brank, J.D., Ph.D., is currently the
Director of the Center on Children, Families,
and the Law, Professor of Psychology, and Cour-
tesy Professor of Law at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. Her research primarily
focuses on the way the law intervenes (and
sometimes interferes) in family and personal
decision making. Related to the current article,
the authors have recently completed a series of studies funded by
the National Science Foundation examining people’s willingness to
consent to police searches.
Jennifer Groscup, J.D., Ph.D., is an Associate
Professor in the Psychology and Legal Studies
departments at Scripps College. Her research
interests have included legal decision making,
particularly in judges’ and jurors’ perceptions of
expert evidence. Her current research investi-
gates issues related to the Fourth Amendment
including consent searches, privacy expecta-
tions, and the use of law enforcement dogs. She is the President-
Elect of the American Psychology-Law Society, Division 41 of the
American Psychological Association.
Emma Marshall is a third-year graduate stu-
dent in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Law-Psychology and
Social-Cognitive Program at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. She received her B.A. in Psy-
chology from Pomona College in 2014. Her pri-
mary research interests are in the intersection of
the Fourth Amendment, privacy, and consent to
search decision making. She is especially inter-
ested in judicial reasoning and perceptions of police searches in
situations involving K-9 officers and drug-sniffing dogs.
Lori Hoetger is an Assistant Public Defender in
Douglas County, Nebraska. She graduated from
the University of Nebraska Law-Psychology
program, completing her J.D. in 2014 with
highest distinction and Ph.D. in Psychology in
2018. Before her current position, she served as
a judicial law clerk on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Court Review - Volume 55 61
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Associa-
tion, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles, essays,
and book reviews. Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful
information to the working judges of the United States and Canada.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new proce-
dures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing sub-
stantive information regarding an area of law likely to encountered
by many judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be used by
judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,000 members of the American
Judges Association (AJA), as well as many law libraries. About 40
percent of the members of the AJA are general-jurisdiction, state trial
judges. Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, including
municipal court and other specialized court judges. The remainder
include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges, and
administrative-law judges.
Articles: Articles should be submitted in double-spaced text with
footnotes in Microsoft Word format. The suggested article length for
Court Review is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text
(including the footnotes). Footnotes should conform to the current
edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation. Articles
should be of a quality consistent with better state-bar-association law
journals and/or other law reviews.
Essays: Essays should be submitted in the same format as articles.
Suggested length is between 6 and 12 pages of double-spaced text
(including any footnotes).
Book Reviews: Book reviews should be submitted in the same
format as articles. Suggested length is between 3 and 9 pages of
double-spaced text (including any footnotes).
Pre-commitment: For previously published authors, we will con-
sider making a tentative publication commitment based upon an
article outline. In addition to the outline, a comment about the spe-
cific ways in which the submission will be useful to judges and/or
advance scholarly discourse on the subject matter would be appreci-
ated. Final acceptance for publication cannot be given until a com-
pleted article, essay, or book review has been received and reviewed
by the Court Review editor or board of editors.
Editing: Court Review reserves the right to edit all manuscripts. 
Submission: Submissions should be made by email. Please send
them to Editors@CourtReview.org. Submissions will be acknowl-
edged by email. Notice of acceptance, rejection, or requests for
changes will be sent following review.
Court Review Author Submission Guidelines
